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In Nepal, the historical evidence shows that migration to the terai increased after 
the eradication of malaria in the late 1950s and has been increasing ever since. 
More recently, however, out-migration from the terai is rapidly increasing. By 
applying both qualitative and quantitative research methods, in-depth qualitative 
interviews, focus group discussions and household survey were used for data 
collection, with considerable inputs from ethnographical fieldwork for about 21 
months. The paper presents three types of population flows in the historical 
pattern. First, the history of Nepal as an arena of population movement; second, 
the gradual opening up of the terai, leading to the hills-terai movement; and the 
third, the current outward flow as an individual migration for work. The paper 
exemplifies that poverty and lack of arable land are not the only push factors, but 
that pursuing a better quality of life is gaining importance as a migration motive. 
We conclude that like movements of people, their motives for moving are also 
not static and cannot be taken for granted. 
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Introduction 
In-migration to and out-migration from Nepal 
and the terai is not a new phenomenon. 
Nepalese migration is generally attributed to 
poverty, destitution, unequal allocation of and 
distribution of resources, geographical variation 
of labour demand and so on (KC 2003). 
However, the trend, pattern, causes, 
consequences, and drivers are changing over 
time. This paper highlights how the perceptions, 
motivations and discourses of migration are 
changing across time and space. In the past, 
there was a high level of in-migration to Nepal, 
from both of its neighbours: China and India. 
Migrants from China were largely nomadic 
Mongoloid people who wanted to escape the 
harsh climate of Tibet. The Indo-Aryans from 
India, especially the Brahmins and Rajputs, 
were fleeing the religious crusades of invading 
Mughals and their suppression against Hindus. 
Other migrants from India (especially those 
from Bihar and West Bengal) were attracted by 
the agricultural potential of the terai land 
(Kansakar 1984; Savada 1991). 
 Within the country, the terai was (and still 
is) considered to be a frontier land for promising 
agricultural livelihood opportunities. Hence, 
hill-to-terai migration became a prominent 
demographic, socio-political and economic 
phenomenon. The fertile land, plain topography, 
easy access, and improved infrastructure were 
pull factors, while the uneven topography, lack 
of arable and fertile land, and the miserable 
lives in the hills were the push factors. Based on 
a study carried out in 1988, Shrestha et al. 
(1993: 793) report, “At the core of this 
migration stream lies a large-scale relocation of 
people from the highland villages in the hills to 
the terai frontier in the plain, stretching east-
west along the Nepal-India border. It accounts 
for nearly 80 per cent of Nepal’s internal 
migration”. 
 Until the mid-1950s, there was little within 
the country mobility of people, with regard to 
in-migration to the terai as well as out-
migration from the hills. However, due to 
population pressure and the paucity of land 
resources in the hills, the eradication of malaria 
and the implementation of land resettlement 
programs in the terai, migration to the terai 
increased after the 1950s, and was identified as 
lifetime internal migration in the 1981 census 
(Savada 1991). Especially, since 1990, 
individual labour out-migration from the terai to 
urban centres in the country and abroad is an 
increasing trend. 
 Although Nepalese literature on migration 
considers the terai a receiving area, labour out-
migration (from the terai) is now eminent, 
inducing tremendous sociocultural changes in 
the region. Migration itself used to be 
considered a ‘last resort’ livelihood option, a 
shameful venture of unfortunate households 
inspired by the vision of better options 
elsewhere (Hutt 1998; Golay 2006). Now the 
situation has changed. Nepal is experiencing an 
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exodus of international labour migrants, the 
majority of them being from the terai, which 
historically had the image of a migrant-
receiving area.  
 Against the background outlined above, this 
paper aims to shed light on the changing 
migration flows and shifting motives of 
migrants by focusing on the terai. Migration can 
be defined as spatial mobility of people, in the 
study of which the temporal dimension 
intersects with the spatial dimension (Jones 
1990). Migration theory has long been 
dominated by neoclassical economics, which 
framed spatial mobility as the aggregated result 
of the rational decision of individuals in search 
of better economic prospects. New economic 
approaches to labour migration rejected this 
individualistic bias and emphasized the role of 
family, households and even communities in 
migration decision-making (Castles and Millet 
2009). We concur with the latter view, which is 
reflected in our data. The social scientific 
literature on migration shows two main strands 
of investigation: research on the determinants of 
migration in the area of origin and research on 
the incorporation of migrants in the social 
structures in the area of destination. This paper 
addresses neither strand in particular. Instead, 
we intend to bridge the divide by taking the 
terai as the starting point, presenting it as a site 
that through time displays multi-directional 
population movement. In fact, what we do could 
be called a ‘social history of the terai’, much in 
the same way as a study on Patagonia 
documented the ‘social life of a region’ (Blanco 
Wells 2009).  
 The following section presents the context 
of in- and out-migration history in Nepal and 
relating to this to the terai. We describe how the 
research area, located in the terai, became part 
of these historical and contemporary regional 
population movements. Subsequently, the data 
collection process and the main features of the 
research areas are described. In the empirical 
section, by analysing the quantitative and 
qualitative data collected in the field, the paper 
shows how in the terai not only people’s 
movements changed but also their motivation 
for moving.  
 
The setting: history of in- and out-migration 
in Nepal 
The Nepalese history of migration is 
complicated and it is difficult to construct in a 
linear fashion. “Underlying the history of both 
hills and plains is the complex relationship 
between human beings and their physical 
environment. The middle hills offered early 
settlers a refuge from the enervating heat and 
the greater risk of infection on the plains. […] 
More recently, population pressure in the hills 
and improved technology has made the terai 
plains more attractive” (Whelpton 2008: 2). 
Different forms of migration such as internal, 
international, immigration, emigration, hill-to-
terai, interregional, rural-rural, rural-urban,
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etcetera, have featured in the Nepalese 
migration literature for a long time (e.g. Dahal 
1983; Gartaula 2009; Gurung 2001; Kansakar 
1984; Seddonet al. 2002; Sharma and Sharma 
2011). The literature shows that the changing 
discourses of migration and its global-local 
interactions in relation to the global forces 
impinging upon local processes have become 
topics of academic interest. 
 
In-migration to Nepal and the Terai 
Migration from neighbouring countries into 
Nepal has been going on since the dawn of 
civilization. The ancient migration flows from 
the north were largely of the nomadic 
Mongoloid people from Tibet, while those from 
the south were Indo-Aryans from India (Savada 
1991). The literature shows that in-migration 
from the north was voluntary in nature; people 
who came from the harsh climate of the Tibetan 
plateau were in search of a more agreeable 
habitat. In-migration from the south was 
involuntary; people sought shelter against 
political persecution and repression by powerful 
enemies in India (Kansakar 1984). 
 After the unification of Nepal in 1768, the 
Shah rulers encouraged Indian people to settle 
in the terai, the lowland plains (Dahal 1983). 
However, before the Muslim invasions in India, 
migration from India to Nepal was confined to 
the elites, such as kings, nobles and their 
attendants. During the Muslim invasions, Nepal 
sheltered many Indians who took refuge to 
avoid being forcefully converted to Islam. Their 
number was so huge that they encroached upon 
the fertile lands of the indigenous populations of 
the terai and drove them to the slopes of the 
hills (Kansakar 1984). An analysis of the 
Nepalese economic history from 1768 to 1846, 
Regmi ([1972]1999) reports that the local 
administrators in the terai were encouraged to 
import settlers from India. Whelpton (2008: 
125) notes: “A disputed number of Indians 
moved into the terai, where, before large-scale 
migration from the Nepalese hills began in the 
late 1950s, the great majority of the inhabitants 
were already Indian in language and culture”. 
These facts, actually, explain the high presence 
of people of Indian origin in the Nepal terai.  
 Subedi (1991) distinguishes two forms of 
immigration to Nepal: regular and periodic. The 
first regular immigration was from Tibet to the 
hills and from India to the terai, while the 
second regular immigration included people 
from India, Bangladesh and Burma. He reports 
five periodic flows of population into the Nepal 
terai: 1) Hindus from North India during 
eleventh and twelfth centuries as a result of the 
Muslim invasion in India; 2) About 16000 
Tibetan refugees in 1959/60 due to political 
instability in Tibet; 3) Nepali-origin people from 
Burma because of the Burmese Nationalization 
Act in 1964; 4) About 10000 Bihari Muslims 
from Bangladesh in around the 1970s; and 5) a 
(return) flow of a considerable number of 
Nepali people who were forced to leave 
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Nagaland and Mizoram in the late 1960s. With 
few exceptions, these people went to the terai 
(Subedi 1991: 84).  
 Until the end of the nineteenth century, most 
of the migration to the terai was involuntary 
migration. Later on, the terai became an 
attractive place for immigrants. In the early 
twentieth century, Nepalese government 
encouraged migration from India as a means of 
opening up the terai, which up to then had 
remained largely undeveloped (Dahal 1983). 
Yet, the terai did not attract Nepali hill people. 
They preferred the northern and north-eastern 
parts of India because of cultural similarities 
(Subedi 1991). The pattern was that of either 
hill-to-hill or plain-to-plain migration. Indians 
from the plain came to settle in lowland terai 
and Nepalese hill people went to the Indian 
hills. 
 However, Dahal (1983) provides another 
explanation for the avoidance of the terai by 
Nepali hill people: “Settlement in the [terai] 
area had been avoided by the hill people 
because of the presence of deadly malaria. Up to 
the late 1950s, the whole terai region was then 
called a Kala Pani (Death Valley) by the hill 
people”. In a similar vein, Gurung (2001) notes 
that migration before 1950 was mostly directed 
eastwards along the hill corridor. Only since the 
1950s, when malaria was eradicated, the terai 
became an attractive destination. 
 The population structure of the country after 
1950 corroborates the above descriptions, 
showing an increased population growth in the 
terai. The average annual population growth 
rate for the country during 1952/54-81 was 2.2 
per cent, varying from 1.2 per cent in the 
mountains and hills to 3.3 per cent in the terai. 
During the same period, the share in the total 
population living in the terai increased from 
34.7 to 48.7 per cent. During the period of 1961-
81, the terai experienced a 2.5 times increase in 
population and a 6.4 times increase in net 
migration. Whereas the hill region was 
experiencing negative net migration and had a 
lower population growth (Gurung 1988: 67-68). 
Whelpton (2008: 123) reports, “by the 1980s, 
only 45 per cent of Nepal’s population lived in 
the hills, compared with 60 per cent twenty 
years earlier”. 
 
Out-migration from Nepal and the Terai 
The history of out-migration from Nepal is more 
recent than that of in-migration, which goes 
back for about 200 years (Adhikari 2006; 
Seddon et al. 2002). In the past, out-migration 
from Nepal was confined mainly to its 
neighbours encompassing pilgrims, devotees, 
political refugees, and soldiers. Another form of 
out-migration found in the literature is when the 
first Nepali men migrated to Lahore (in present 
day’s Pakistan) to join the army of the Sikh 
ruler Ranjit Singh in early nineteenth century 
(cf. Thieme and Wyss 2005). Later on, lahure 
became the nickname given to the people who 
join the armed forces of India, Hong Kong,
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Singapore, and United Kingdom. It is 
sometimes used to address all Nepali people 
living abroad. Recently, the working class 
migrant labourers are termed ‘New Lahures’ 
(Seddon et al. 2001), while the word NRN 
(Non-Resident Nepali) is gaining popularity in 
certain social and political circles. Being NRN 
seems to contribute to social status.  
 Nepal’s international border with India and 
China remained almost open for the movement 
of people from both of her neighbours. With 
China, it became closed after 1950, while it has 
remained open with India till now, without 
restriction on the movement of people of both 
countries. Hence, because of open borders, 
cultural similarities, and the fact that no papers 
are required for crossing the border, migration 
to and from India is of all times and even 
unaccounted. Throughout the nineteenth century 
and also into the twentieth, Nepalese men 
served in India, often accompanied by their 
wives and other family members and started 
living there permanently (Seddon 2005; Hutt 
1998).  
 In the recent history, Nepal is experiencing a 
huge out-migration and gaining status as a 
labour-exporting country. Out-migration of 
Nepalese youths to foreign countries increased 
especially after restoration of multi-party 
democracy and liberalization in 1990. Following 
a decade-long Maoist insurgency that ended in 
2006, Nepal is experiencing a number of 
political transitions, for example, the abolition 
of monarchy and the conversion of Nepal into a 
Federal Democratic Republic state with a 
President as an elected head of the state. 
However, the uncertain political and economic 
situation has been a major driving force for 
Nepalese youth to look for alternatives abroad 
(Bohra and Massey 2009; Ghimire et al. 2010; 
Wagle 2012). Consequently, the proportion of 
households receiving remittances has increased 
from 32 per cent in 2003/04 to 56 per cent in 
2010/11 (CBS 2011). Since 1942, when the data 
were made available, there is an increasing trend 
of out-migration from Nepal. In this period, the 
migrated population increased from about 
88,000 in 1942 (cf. Kansakar 1984) to more 
than four million in 2008 (World Bank 2009). 
The calculations of the Nepal Rastra Bank show 
about US$ 2.7 billion of remittances sent by the 
migrants working in other countries than India 
in the fiscal year 2008/09, which is about 22 per 
cent of the country’s total GDP. It is estimated 
that remittances have contributed to 30 per cent 
of the GDP (World Bank 2009). 
 These out-migrants can be grouped into 
labour migrants, students, emigrants (under 
high-skilled immigration programs of different 
countries), the Gorkhas, and the people working 
in diplomatic missions and NGOs. Although all 
classified as the absentee population by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, clearly the out-
migrants are not a homogeneous group. Their 
aspirations, motivations and reasons for 
migration differ considerably, sometimes even 
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within the same group. Moreover, these figures 
do not include migration to India because of the 
open border. Government officials agree on the 
fact that the figures only include those who 
migrate formally; the almost equal numbers of 
people migrating informally and illegally are not 
part of the official statistics. 
 It is important to note that in the discussion 
about migration from Nepal, one always comes 
across the term Gorkha (or ‘Gurkhas’)1. The 
term was coined during the colonial period in 
India to denote a specific group of people 
originated from Nepal serving the then British 
East India Company. From 1768 to 1836, 
Nepal’s relation with the British East India 
Company was not harmonious. The then king 
Prithvi Narayan Shah was always suspicious 
about British influence in Nepal and thwarted 
captain Kinloch’s expedition to the country 
(Sharma 1973). After this, the British came to 
admire the Gorkhas for their loyalty, bravery 
and courage (Dahal 1983). During World War 
II, it was difficult to get able-bodied men in the 
hills of Nepal because they had joined the allied 
forces (Kansakar 1984: 53). Mazumdar (1963) 
reports: “Three battalions of Gorkha regiments 
were raised as early as 1815. By the time the 
Sepoy Mutiny was crushed, the Gorkhas had 
proved their masters right. A series of recruiting 
depots came up along the long stretch of areas 
                                                
1The word ‘Gorkha’ is derived from the small principality 
(now a district) of Nepal by the same time. The kingdom 
of Gorkha was established by Drabya Shah in 1559. It is 
located at about 60 km west of Kathmandu.  
bordering Nepal” (cited in Golay 2006: 32-33). 
Nowadays, Gorkhas are popularly recognized as 
good soldiers worldwide and the Nepal army 
and police are involved in the UN peacekeeping 
force in many countries.  
 Golay (2006: 33) says, “By 1864, the British 
government issued a charter providing for the 
Gorkha Regiment to buy land for settlement 
stations at Dehradun, Gorakhpur, Shillong, etc. 
In Darjeeling, the Gorkha Recruitment Depot 
was opened in 1890, and it continues to draw 
recruits from in and around Darjeeling and 
neighbouring Nepal.” Hence, as the Gorkha 
settlements increased in number and size, they 
also attracted Nepali workers seeking 
employment in other sectors like tea plantations, 
agriculture, as watchmen, household servants, 
and security guards (Kansakar 1984; Subedi 
1991).  
 Comparing Nepalese in- and out-migration 
yields a contrasting picture. In-migration in the 
past tends to be a more permanent phenomenon, 
while out-migration now is a temporary 
phenomenon. Migration in the previous time 
was more from hills to the terai, from both 
within as well as outside the country, while 
recent data depict the terai as a migrant-sending 
area. Figure 1 presents the top ten districts that 
are pioneering labour export to foreign countries 
in the recent years. Among them, Tanahu is the 
only hilly district; rest of the districts are from 
the terai, changing direction of the Nepalese
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out-migration pattern. The district of Jhapa, the 
study area, ranks second in labour out-
migration. 
 
Figure 1: Number of migrants in the top 10 districts 
from 2003 to 2009. Source: Department of Foreign 
Employment, Government of Nepal 
 
Methodology 
The study is based on both qualitative and 
quantitative methods of data collection. The 
fieldwork started in June 2008 and consisted of 
three partly overlapping phases. The first phase 
mainly comprised a migration assessment 
survey among 1791 households that covered 90 
per cent households of Maharani Jhoda village 
development committee (VDC), the research 
area. Purposes of this survey were to classify 
households based on the changing household 
composition due to male labour out-migration 
and prepare a sampling frame for the household 
survey conducted in the second phase. Maharani 
Jhoda was selected 
because of its high 
incidence of labour 
out-migration and 
its dynamic history 
of in- and out-
migration2. 
 In the second 
phase (Feb-May 
2009), the 
household survey 
was carried out 
among 277 
households using a 
stratified random sampling. Four female 
enumerators were hired and trained to carry out 
the survey. Topics included were household 
characteristics, ethnic distribution of out-
migration per destination, reasons for out-
migration, and ownership of modern appliances. 
The interview schedule was pre-tested with the 
households outside the study area before actual 
survey administration.  
 In the third phase (Aug-Dec 2009), 26 in-
depth interviews were conducted with the actors 
                                                
2Due to lack of official statistics, the choice of Maharani 
Jhoda VDC was checked with the information sought 
from district officials (such as from the District 
Development Office and District Agriculture 
Development Office), leading manpower recruitment 
agencies within the district, and the local leaders as key 
informants. 
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involved in labour out-migration. The key 
informant interviews, focus group discussion 
and observation were done in all phases of the 
study. Checklists were used to conduct key 
informant interviews, focus group discussions 
and in-depth interviews. In addition, a diary was 
maintained during the entire fieldwork period. 
Excel and PASW-Statistics were used for the 
analysis of quantitative data, while the 
qualitative data were analysed manually using 
qualitative content analysis technique (Zhang 
and Wildemuth 2009).  
 
The research area 
The fieldwork was 
conducted in Maharani 
Jhoda Village Development 
Committee (VDC) of Jhapa 
district. The district is 
located in the eastern terai, 
one of the three ecological 
regions of Nepal (High 
Mountain, Mid Hills and the 
terai) that run from north to 
south. The terai is an 
extension of the flood plain 
of the Ganges River in India. Maharani Jhoda is 
located at a distance of 56 km west from the 
district headquarters, Chandragadhi, and 550 km 
east from the country’s capital of Kathmandu 
(Figure 2). The available historical sources 
indicate that the settlement in Maharani Jhoda 
dates back from 1912/13, when people from 
India and some indigenous groups settled in the 
northern and western part of the VDC. Other 
parts of the VDC were then still forest area, 
belonging to the then royal family. The name of 
the VDC is derived from the words Maharani 
(meaning head queen) and Jhoda (meaning 
settlement after deforestation). In 1955/56, the 
government started logging in the forest. Later 
on, in 1959/60, when the land was still 
unoccupied the hill migrants from adjoining 
hilly districts started to migrate to this area.  
 
Figure 2: Map of Nepal showing the study area. 
Source: International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD) 
 
 While this in-migration continued, out-
migration began in 1975 and is increasing ever 
since. However, the nature of in- and out- 
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migration is different; the former in-migration 
was permanent family migration, while the later 
out-migration is temporary individual migration 
for work. In the phenomenon of labour out-
migration, one or more members of households 
migrate to urban centres within the country or 
abroad for one or two years and return back 
home. They usually do this more than once and 
the cycle continues for many years, sometimes 
until the retirement of the migrant worker. 
 The survey data show that the dominant 
caste/ethnic group3 in Maharani Jhoda is the Hill 
Brahmin-Chhetri4 group (56.7%); followed by 
the Hill Janajati5 (21.3%) such as Limbu, Rai, 
Tamang, Magar, Newar; the Terai Janajati 
(12.3%), like Tajpuriya, Rajbansi, Tharu, Satar; 
the Hill Dalit6 (4.0%), and the Other Terai group 
                                                
3In Nepal, the terms caste and ethnic group are used 
interchangeably in many cases. However, the caste 
system does not necessarily follow the ethnic division and 
vice versa. For details please refer to notes 4, 5 and 6. 
4Brahmins and Chhetris are the dominant caste/ethnic 
groups (of Hindu origin) in Nepal in terms of their 
economic, political, and also religious order. These are 
also known as so-called the higher caste people. For detail 
description of caste system in Nepal: 
http://countrystudies.us/nepal/31.htm (accessed 27 
February 2010). 
5Janajatis (indigenous nationalities) are generally non-
Hindu ethnic groups with their distinct identities 
regarding religious beliefs, social practices and cultural 
values (Nepal Foundation for Development of Indigenous 
Nationalities - NDFIN, 2009: www.nfdin.gov.np, 
accessed on 25 February 2010). The foundation has 
identified a total of 59 Janajatis and based on their 
geographical habitation they are grouped into four 
categories i.e. mountain region (17 ethnic groups), hills 
(24 ethnic groups), inner terai (7 ethnic groups) and terai 
(11 ethnic groups).  
6Dalit is a word coined to denote all the so-called 
untouchable caste groups such as Kami (blacksmiths), 
Damai (tailors) and Sarki (cobblers) in Nepal. 
(5.8%) that includes Muslims and others such as 
Sah, Gupta, Thakur, etc. Though the research 
area is located in the terai, most of the 
inhabitants are hill migrants. If we relate ethnic 
composition to the migration status, hill 
migrants surpass the local terai people; 87 per 
cent of the hill migrants have out-migrated 
compared to 13 per cent of the terai people. 
This demographic change shows a contrasting 
pattern of migration flows between the earlier 
in-migration and the present out-migration. The 
Hill Brahmin/Chhetris and Hill Janajati who at 
the time moved to the terai did so in the form of 
permanent family migration, while now they are 
engaged in individual temporary out-migration 
from the terai. 
 
Results and discussion 
In-migration to the area: an early account 
The narratives from the early settlers in 
Maharani Jhoda indicate that in the early days 
there was plenty of land in the area, as indicated 
below. Though people did not have to buy land, 
the local leaders used to collect money from 
ordinary people for land that actually was not 
theirs. They could not offer legal ownership of 
land but still were taking advantage of the 
situation. The leaders’ incentive to engage in the 
land distribution was the money they could 
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generate this way and other social benefits that 
would accrue to them as leaders.  
 The first mapping and registration (napi) of 
land was held in 1965. Yet, many people did not 
get the certificate of ownership. The registration 
at that time was not the way the farmers wanted 
it. They questioned its correctness because the 
land was registered as tenant registration (mohi 
darta) without title deeds, as if the farmers were 
the tenants of the king. 
 In 1968, the land was planned according to 
an Israeli engineer who was invited to Nepal for 
this purpose. According to his plan, the roads 
should have been 50-feet width and at certain 
distances there should have been provision of 
nine feet streets to connect the two 50-feet wide 
roads. Land for grazing animals, ponds, and 
graveyards, and so on, was also allocated. Later 
on, people invaded and registered most of those 
communal lands. Generally, the roads were not 
disturbed, but the narrow streets, graveyards, 
grazing lands, and ponds were infringed. The 
land mapping exercise was not successful and 
its results were never published. No records 
were found. Nevertheless, the present settlement 
is based on the outlines of the 1968 mapping.  
 In 1978, a new attempt at land registration 
was made. Land was redistributed using a 
maximum of two hectares per family, for which 
money had to be paid to the government. The 
amounts to be paid to the government were 
NPR.700 for abbal (the top quality land), 650 
for doyam (medium quality land) and 500 for 
sim and chahar (poor quality land). Of those 
who used to cultivate more than two hectares, 
the excess land was seized during the 
registration. However, clever people had already 
transferred the excess amount in the name of 
other family members. Some commissions were 
formed, of which the Rai commission was able 
to distribute many certificates of land 
ownership. After that, the Sitoula commission 
provided the remaining certificates. Hence, most 
people have got their certificate of land 
registration by now. 
 The section below presents the narratives of 
early settlers and local leaders. The narratives 
contain information on how they got land, the 
history of their land, how they found this area, 
what the incentives to migrate were, and what 
their experiences were in the earlier days. 
 
The story of RKP (72, Male, Brahmin): 
RKP is one of the earlier setters and was 
involved in the land distribution process in the 
area. Before he came to this place, he used to 
stay at Damak, a nearby town. There was a big 
forest area in the southwest of Damak bazaar 
called Barhaghare, which was attractive to both 
the farmers (hill migrants) and the government 
people. Shantabir Lama, a colonel, was given 
responsibility to look after the land. The farmers 
wanted to have land at Barhaghare for 
cultivation, while Shantabir wanted it cleared to 
develop it for commercial use for the benefit of 
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the royal family, which he ultimately did. Even 
today, part of the land is a tea plantation, while 
other parts were used for settlements. As RKP 
and his fellow farmers did not get land 
at Damak, they continued to explore the 
possibilities to get land. The two leaders at the 
time were Hinda Bahadur Rai (HBR) and 
Indramani Karki (IMK). They were close to the 
government officials; RKP referred to them as 
the ‘king’s people’. The leaders applied for 
permission to distribute the recently cleared 
forestland and establish settlements in the area.  
 On the day of 31 January 1962, HBR and 
IMK with the support from local people 
appealed to the then king Mahendra Shah who 
had come for a royal safari. They stopped him 
on the road and submitted their petition. RKP 
explained:  
“We marched on his way and blocked 
the motor of king Mahendra with the 
help of women because being males 
we could not go in front of the king as 
we feared his police. They could easily 
arrest us. The king asked what we 
wanted; we told him that as we did not 
have the land and that is what we 
wanted.” (RKP, 6 August 2008) 
 The king then ordered to distribute land 
ranging from two to five bigha (1 bigha is 
equivalent to 0.66 ha) per family. The 
measurement was not so precise, but people had 
a rough idea about the amount of land they hold. 
RKP says,  
“In the beginning, I had about 11 bigha 
(7.3 ha) land as I was one of the 
leaders during land distribution; I kept 
more land for myself. However, later 
on the system did not allow me to keep 
more than five bigha.” (RKP, 6 August 
2008) 
 According to RKP, there was a big Madhesi 
(people from the madhes or the terai) settlement 
in Khangta village (ward 1) and west of the 
VDC (ward 4). The remaining area was still 
forestland: the dense Sal-forest (Sorea robusta). 
The hill migrants started to come to the area in 
1961/62. Actually, the in-migration already 
started in 1959 but the high influx began in 
1963 after the jhoda (settlement) opened.  
 
The story of DKP (64, Male, Chhetri): 
DKP is a political leader who was also involved 
in land distribution and registration. According 
to him, the forest was cleared in 1956 under the 
captainship of Shantabir Lama from Damak. 
The forest was in the name of the then king’s 
wife. Out of the total 4000 ha forestland, 2000 
ha alone was in Maharani Jhoda, the remaining 
land in Kohabara, Juropani and Gauradaha 
VDCs.  
 DKP said there was no specific land 
distribution system; some migrants from the 
hills just occupied the land and started 
cultivation. There is a place called Dudhali in 
Juropani VDC where kings used to camp when 
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they came for hunting. Once, when king 
Mahendra had come to the Dudhali camp, the 
earlier settlers of this area went to meet him and 
submitted their petition about the land. The king 
ordered to provide not more than 3.3 ha of land 
per family and the DKP and his fellow leaders 
started distributing the land here. Actually, they 
were already settled but then got permission 
from the king. Asked about what people drove 
to migrate to this place, he said: 
“People came to this place in search of 
food. They did not have enough food 
(rice) in the hills. Agriculture was not 
so developed. Most of them first went 
to Burma, Manipur and Assam. Later 
on, they stopped going there due to 
political problems in India and Burma. 
Those who were already there, 
returned to Nepal. They did not go 
back to the hills but came to the terai 
instead, like here where agriculture 
was good and land was still virgin.” 
(DKP, 10 August 2008) 
 In this description, the trend and patterns of 
in-migration to the research area among 
different ethnic groups show different picture. 
The hill people (Brahmins/Chhetris, Hill 
Janajati and Hill Dalits) came from hilly areas 
of eastern Nepal and India, especially after the 
1950s, while the Terai Janajati seemed to arrive 
earlier than the hill people using different path. 
BTC (65, Male, Terai Janajati) said he was born 
in this place, but his grandfather came from 
India long ago. Another respondent (BPL, 72, 
Male, Hill Janajati) said that when he migrated 
to this place in 1961, there were few Dhimal and 
Tajpuriya settlements in the area. Both Dhimal 
and Tajpuriya belong to the Terai Janajati 
group. This difference in trend and patterns of 
in-migration to the terai has also been reported 
in the studies of Gurung (2001) and Subedi 
(1991).  
 Two main factors played a role in the 
movement to the terai and the research area. On 
the one hand, as shown by the narratives, there 
was plenty of land. This abundance of land is 
also revealed by studies on other terai areas 
(Dahal 1983; Shrestha et al. 1993). On the other 
hand, out-migration was a means to escape the 
lack of arable land, oppression and exploitation 
of moneylenders in the hills (Hutt 1998). “The 
migration of ‘Nepalis’ from the eastern hills of 
Nepal into northeast India and beyond during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is a 
poorly documented phenomenon, although it 
has had a formative effect on the culture and 
politics of the region” (Hutt 1998: 196). 
Because of the lack of empirical studies about 
that time, Hutt (1998) analysed a number of 
novels, poems and stories based on social 
realism, using the truism that ‘literature is a 
mirror of the society’ as point of departure. He 
concludes that all the texts he described refer to 
the problems people had in the hills and how 
they tried to find a better living elsewhere. In 
fact, these two situations in the hills and in the 
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terai served as pull and push factors to drive 
people to the terai, though using different 
pathways. At that time, the economy in the terai 
was predominantly agrarian and having fertile 
land was not only a matter of food security, but 
also a status symbol.  
 
The current outward move 
 The current scenario is entirely different. In-
migration is rare, but out-migration is 
increasing. In the research area, more than half 
of the households (53.3%) have at least one 
migrant member, almost 
one migrant per 
household. The average 
age of migrant members is 
29.2 years with a 
maximum of 65 years; 58 
per cent is married (42% 
unmarried). Likewise, 
almost 80 per cent of the 
migrants are between 20 
and 40 years of age, which 
can be explained as 
follows. First, these are the 
economically active ages, 
from which the employers 
want to recruit their 
labour. Second, persons of 
school-going age see their slightly older peers 
migrating while they are at school, hence 
already anticipating the difficulties they will 
experience to find a job locally after finishing 
school. Third, as reflected in the narratives of 
the migrants (see below), migrants are pressed 
by family obligations once they get married. It 
forces them to engage in rewarding economic 
activities, of which out-migration has proven to 
be a good option. Migrants of ages below 14 
and above 55 years are not necessarily labour 
migrants; they can be students or persons 
accompanying in-country migrants. In terms of 
destination, after in-country migration, Qatar is 
the leading place in receiving Nepalese migrant 
workers, followed by Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, 
and United Arab Emirates, and India (Table 1). 
Table 1: Destination of migration according to 
caste/ethnic group. Source: Migration Assessment 
Survey 2008 
 
Destination 
Caste/Ethnicity (%) 
Hill 
Brahmin-
Chhetri 
Hill 
Janajati 
Hill 
Dalit 
Terai 
Janajati 
Other 
Terai 
Total 
In country 228 (34.0) 39 (22.0) 4 (9.1) 10 (18.2) 2 (25.0) 283 (29.7) 
Qatar 110 (16.4) 26 (14.7) 11 (25.0) 9 (16.4) 1 (12.5) 157 (16.5) 
Malaysia 81 (12.1) 30 (16.9) 6 (13.6) 9 (16.4) 0 (0.0) 126 (13.2) 
Saudi Arabia 79 (11.8) 37 (20.9) 4 (9.1) 4 (7.3) 0 (0.0) 124 (13.0) 
UAE 78 (11.6) 11 (6.2) 7 (15.9) 4 (7.3) 0 (0.0) 100 (10.5) India 41 6.1) 9 (5.1)  .  14 (25.5) 3 37.5) 74 (7.8) 
Other Gulf 
states 
30 (4.5) 15 (8.5) 5 (11.4) 5 (9.1) 1 (12.5) 56 (5.9) 
Europe 8 (1.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 8 (0.8) 
America 3 (0.4) 1 (0.6) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (0.4) 
Others 12 (1.8) 9 (5.1) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (12.5)  22 (2.3) 
Total 670 (70.2) 177 (18.6) 44 (4.6) 55 (5.8) 8 (0.8) 954 (100) 
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 The ethnic variation shows that the hill 
groups like Hill Brahmin-Chhetri, Hill Janajati 
and Hill Dalit are dominant among the in-
country migrants and in migration to the Gulf 
countries and Malaysia, while the Terai Janajati 
and Other Terai group end up staying in the 
country or going to India. None of the people 
from the Hill Dalit, Terai Janajati and the Other 
Terai group have migrated to Europe and 
America. 
 Using data from the Nepal Living Standard 
Survey 2003/04, Gurung (2008) outlines five 
forms of capital that determine the inclusion or 
exclusion of certain group in the migration 
process: economic, human, cultural, social and 
geographical capital. He postulates: “The 
probability of migration is quite high (p=0.208) 
among the hill high caste groups. Historically, 
migration of hill groups has been higher than 
that of terai groups. There may be two reasons: 
first, the economic viability of the hills and 
mountainous areas is limited; second, the state 
policies have been in favour of the hill groups. 
The former reason compels hill groups to look 
for new opportunities and the latter facilitates 
them to grasp the new opportunities” (Gurung 
2008: 17). Gurung argues that the social 
exclusion as measured by economic assets and 
human, cultural, social and geographical capital 
explains or is correlated with the migration 
decision and the choice of destination. This is 
exemplified by this study since the resource-
poor Terai Janajati and Other Terai groups tend 
to migrate to India (Table 1). This would partly 
be explained by the lesser cost involved going to 
India and partly by the socio-political exclusion 
of Terai Janajati and Other Terai groups 
compared to Hill Brahmin/Chhetri and Hill 
Janajati groups.  
 
Reasons for out-migration 
The narratives of the earlier settlers show that 
they came to this place in search of an area 
suitable for rice cultivation. They saw the terai 
as their destination for life, something that 
would enhance their living compared to their 
previous life in the hills. The current population 
is not even the third generation, but the situation 
has drastically changed. The sons (or grandsons) 
of the earlier settlers who are grown up and 
have economic responsibilities find that the 
local economy does not meet their rising 
expectations. They consider out-migration to 
make money for the future. Below, we present 
the narratives of two returned migrants, to show 
what drove them to migrate, and of some key 
informants whom we asked for their views on 
the phenomenon of labour migration in the area. 
 
The story of JBP (38, Male, Hill Janajati): 
JBP went to Malaysia to earn money for the 
future of his family. After he got married he had 
to find ways to meet the growing requirements 
of his expanding family. Due to the division of 
the parental land among three brothers, he did 
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not have enough land to support his family. This 
forced him to migrate, as there were no local 
jobs available. His two elder brothers had 
government positions. He explains his decision 
as follows:  
“I went to Malaysia in 2001 and 
worked there for three years. The idea 
of going abroad came spontaneously. 
What to do! I got married; the family 
size increased, and was running out of 
money. I did not go there immediately 
after my marriage, but after the birth of 
my daughter. Once the family size 
increased, I was pressed by the family 
obligations. I was afraid of my family’s 
future security, as if they would die of 
hunger. I did not have any employment 
here and what would I do if not going 
out”? (JBP, 2 November 2009) 
 
The story of TBP (32, Male, Brahmin): 
The situation of TBP is not much different. He 
decided to migrate, as he could not pursue his 
education due to a financial crisis at home. Also 
he had seen the examples of many people 
moving out: 
“I saw many youths going out for work 
at that time and the economic situation 
at home was not good. So, in 2000 I 
decided to go abroad for work and 
went to Saudi Arabia. I worked there 
for3.5 years. Actually, I wanted to 
study more, at least up to the university 
level, but while I was in the 10+2 level, 
I could not pay the college fees. Then I 
thought if I could make some money 
first to continue my study later, but 
once I got involved in this [gold] 
business after my return my ambition 
to study has gone forever”. (TBP, 2 
November 2009) 
 These two narratives are typical of migrant 
workers, and correspond with the version of key 
informants. Our conversation with DKP 
revealed that the most significant cause of out-
migration is the low incentive from agriculture. 
Subsistence agriculture can hardly provide for 
two meals a day, and people need more than just 
food. DKP said:  
“Due to insufficient income from 
agriculture, people started going out 
for work. It is also due to lack of 
resources; people do not have much 
land, and there are no factories and 
industries around for employment. So 
they have to look for alternative 
sources of income. I think almost every 
household has migrant members. I can 
tell you, if remittances would stop, 
people would suffer from hunger. 
From rice (agricultural) production, 
food would be sufficient but other 
household expenses have to be met 
from outside income. If there is no 
income from non-farm sources (mostly 
remittances) the farm production is 
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hardly enough to cater for the family”. 
(DKP, 10 August 2008) 
 GBP (68, Male, Brahmin) is an ex-
headmaster of a government school and is 
currently engaged as a social worker. He sees 
the unemployment situation, especially among 
the educated people, the low salaries and the 
limited opportunities available in the country as 
the main reasons for labour out-migration. He 
says: 
 “There are over 50 per cent of 
households with migrant members. We 
have to accept it, whether we like it or 
not. Why is the government not able to 
create opportunities for educated 
manpower? […] If the educated 
migrants were employed, we would not 
lose the educated manpower. The 
establishment of private 
boarding schools has absorbed 
some manpower, but the pay 
scale is low. Let’s face it, if a 
person is employed for a salary 
of 1000 rupees/month, it means 
33 rupees per day. You cannot 
imagine how they can survive! 
A person holding a BA or BSc 
degree, who has spent 15 years 
on education! Think about 
yourself, can you work for a 
private boarding school for 
1000 rupees a month?” (GBP, 4 
November 2009) 
 The descriptions above elucidate the reasons 
for out-migration in the research area. The 
respondents have articulated an increased family 
size against decreasing landholdings, few off-
farm or non-farm income-earning opportunities, 
low outputs from agriculture, and the rising 
aspirations of the younger generation. The 
situation of increased unemployment among 
educated people results in increased labour out-
migration. The descriptions are supported by the 
household survey data. A total of 135 
households with migrant members reported the 
reasons for their decision to migrate. The 
respondents were asked to rank the reasons for 
out-migration. Among the six reasons 
mentioned, unemployment ranks first (24.2%): 
about 30 per cent reported unemployment as the 
first reason, 23 per cent as second reason, and 
20 per cent as third reason (Table 2). 
Reasons 
Number of migrants (%) 
As first 
reason 
As second 
reason 
As third 
reason 
Total 
Unemployment 40 (29.6) 31 (23.0) 27 (20.0) 98 (24.2) 
Low agricultural 
income 
29 (21.5) 33 (24.4) 27 (20.0) 89 (22.0) 
Increased debt 33 (24.4) 20 (14.8) 15 (11.1) 68 (16.8) 
Increased fam. size 12 (8.9) 18 (13.3) 23 (17.0) 53 (13.1) 
Local income 
unsatisfactory 
9 (6.7) 16 (11.9) 24 (17.8) 49 (12.1) 
Capital formation 6 (4.4) 10 (7.4) 17 (12.6) 33 (8.1) 
Keen on foreign 
experience 
6 (4.4) 7 (5.2) 2 (1.5) 15 (3.7) 
Total 135 (100.0) 135 (100.0) 135 (100.0) 405 (100.0) 
Table 2: Reasons for out-migration. Source: Household 
Survey 2009 
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It is evident that the most frequently 
mentioned reasons for out-migration relate to 
livelihood and income from agriculture. When 
family size increases, people need to have more 
living expenses, which, coupled with 
unemployment and low agricultural income, 
ultimately leads to indebtedness. Hence, they 
may get trapped in the vicious circle of poverty 
if they would not find alternatives. In such a 
situation, land fragmentation further contributes 
to the problem. “The existing social system of 
equal inheritance of land amongst all sons has 
created fragmentation and increased sub-
division of household plots to the extent that 
land sizes are progressively decreased and 
become insufficient to provide subsistence” 
(Regmi, 1994: 74). In a rural setting like the 
research area, if a household has little land, it 
has to diversify its livelihood activities by 
engaging in off-farm and non-farm activities 
like employment and business. If those 
opportunities are also limited, people try to find 
their way outside their home area.  
 A significantly positive correlation 
(Pearson correlation coefficient=0.232, 
p<0.001) was found between landholding 
size and out-migration. This indicates that 
while formerly migration was inspired by 
motives of poverty and lack of land (previous 
hill to terai migration), in current times the 
motives to move from the terai are different 
and relate to the desire for upward mobility and 
improving the quality of life.  
Return migrants: a source of inspiration 
Out of 20 returnees, seven changed their means 
of living after return. Three started a business in 
the local market centres, while two became bus 
drivers. Interestingly, two migrants, who were 
not involved in agriculture before, took up 
agriculture upon return. The remaining 13 
migrants continued working in agriculture. 
Though the returnees are few in number, their 
way of living after migration or the lifestyle of 
the members of migrant households are 
important motivating factors for the prospective 
migrants. The modern gadgets the returned 
migrants own, such as expensive mobile phones 
and big-screen coloured television sets, and the 
changed lifestyle of migrant households become 
a source of inspiration and aspiration. A 
calculation of the possession of five important 
modern gadgets (coloured television, mobile 
phone, CD/DVD player, and digital camera) 
shows a higher proportion of ownership by 
migrant households than non-migrants (Table 
3).  
Table 3: Possession of modern gadgets by households. 
Source: Household Survey 2009 
 
 Households with Gadgets (%) 
Gadgets Migrant Non-migrant Total 
Colored 
television 
112 (56.9) 85 (43.1) 197 (71.1) 
Mobile phone 93 (55.4) 75 (44.6) 168 (60.6) 
CD/DVD player 44 (58.7) 31 (41.3) 75 (27.2) 
Digital camera 31 (67.4) 15 (32.6) 46 (16.6) 
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 Not only the possession per se but also the 
prices also count. However, we did not go into 
details about brands, makes and exact prices of 
those gadgets, a general observation is that 
migrant households possess those of expensive 
ones, which is also evident from our discussion 
with respondents. The following excerpts from 
focus group discussion give an impression of 
the differences in life-style between migrant and 
non-migrant households. 
[…] A simple example, many people 
you see around with expensive mobile 
phones are from migrant households. 
The mobile phones are either sent by 
migrant workers or bought from 
remittances. Ordinary people are not 
able to buy such expensive mobiles. 
(SGS, 24, Male, Hill Janajati, FGD, 9 
November 2009) 
[…] Labour migration has 
modernized people. For example, 
those who did not have many material 
things before now own expensive 
appliances at home. Those who even 
did not have black and white 
television now possess a colour 
television set, expensive mobiles, and 
so on. (YBK, Male, 21, Chhetri, FGD, 
9 November 2009) 
 Hence, it can be concluded that increased 
possession of modern gadgets and a desired 
advanced lifestyle that migrant households may 
attain also puts pressure on others to move. 
Taking an example from Thai rural-urban 
migration, Mills (1997)concludes that 
commodity consumption is an important 
element in migration decisions. “Migrants’ 
consumption is not simply a reflection of 
material interests or economic needs but is also 
a cultural process, engaging powerful if often 
conflicting cultural discourses about family 
relations, gender roles and [Thai] construction 
of modernity” (Mills 1997: 54). 
 
 
Conclusion 
The paper dealt with three types of population 
flows. First, it discussed the history of Nepal as 
an arena of population movement in terms of the 
longue durée, as exemplified by the Gorkhas 
and the across-border flows to India made 
possible by the open border between Nepal and 
India. Second, it discussed the gradual opening 
up of the terai, leading to the hills-
terai movement of whole families, especially 
after the eradication of malaria, which is the 
recent history. The third flow comprises the 
current outward flow of population in the form 
of individual migration for work, the 
contemporary situation. The paper focused 
especially on the second and the third 
population movements and highlighted the 
changing motives of the people involved, while 
the first one rendered the historical setting that
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shows that in Nepal population movement has 
been of all times.  
 Even though the processes of in- and out-
migration in the terai, in particular in Jhapa 
district and the research area have been going on 
for a long time, the area was always considered 
a place of destination. The motivation for 
migrating to the terai was the search for fertile 
rice-producing land. It is clear that in-migration 
to the area still continues, but that at present out-
migration is becoming more important and is 
motivated by the pursuit of a better quality of 
living. So, from being a migrant-receiving area, 
the terai is increasingly becoming a migrant-
sending area. A study carried out in another 
district in the terai called Chitawan found a 
similar pattern of labour out-migration from the 
district to within as well as outside the country 
(Bohra and Massey 2009). 
 Unemployment, low income from 
agriculture, the growing aspirations of the 
modernized young adult population, lack of 
local opportunities and low incentive for 
educated manpower are the main reasons for 
increasing out-migration in research area. In 
addition, the advanced lifestyle and 
consumption of modern gadgets by migrant 
families are becoming driving forces. Migration 
is occurring not only because of poverty but also 
to upgrade livelihoods and have a better life. 
Out-migration is no longer a last resort for poor 
people as depicted by conventional literature, 
but is a means for upward mobility of relatively 
well-off households. In other words, the better 
opportunities in the place of destination are still 
a pull factor, but the enhancement of future 
livelihood security and the pursuit of a ‘modern’ 
lifestyle have become push factors. 
 The results of this study contradict the 
image of migration as just a coping strategy of 
the poor (Gill 2003) and as a shameful and 
painful experience (Golay 2006; Shrestha 1988). 
But they correspond with the empirical evidence 
that shows migration to be a strategy to improve 
living standards and strengthen the livelihood of 
relatively better-off households (cf. Niehof 
2004). The poorest households are usually 
unable to participate in such processes (De Haas 
2005). Moreover, it has to be noted that labour 
out-migration is not just an individual economic 
decision; it is also a cultural phenomenon (Rigg 
2007) and the decision to migrate is made 
collectively at the level of households and 
families (Gartaula et al. 2012).  
 The paper shows that poverty and lack of 
arable and fertile land as the motives for family 
migration were replaced by the aspirations for 
upward mobility of individual migrants. It 
describes the shift of an area from being a 
receiving to becoming a sending area, and it 
pictures the emergence of lifestyle motives for 
migration. Hence, it is concluded that like 
movements of people, also their motives for 
moving are not static and cannot be taken for 
granted. 
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